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Introduction 
One of Keith Pavitt’s many contributions to the study of innovation is the proposition that 
physical proximity is advantageous for innovative activities that involve highly complex 
technological knowledge, uncertainty, and coordinated experimentation across functional and 
disciplinary boundaries (Pavitt, 1999: XI). This description precisely captures the nature of chip 
design, a process that creates the greatest value in the electronics industry. Pavitt distinguishes 
cognitive and organizational dimensions of technological complexity. As for the cognitive 
dimension, an artifact like a chip is “made up of numerous components and subsystems whose 
interactions are often non-linear and therefore impossible to predict” (Pavitt, 1999: p.X). 
Verification and testing become critical bottlenecks. Hence tacit knowledge is central for 
interpreting the performance of a chip, and for “knowing how and where to search for improved 
performance” (ibid). The organizational dimension of technological complexity implies that “…a 
wide and increasing range of fields of specialized knowledge are being mobilized…”, which 
necessitates “linkages with the wider knowledge communities and the capacity within the firm to 
experiment and learn across cognitive and functional boundaries” (Pavitt, 1999: pages X and 
XI). 
One would thus expect chip design to be spatially immobile, much less prone than 
manufacturing to geographic relocation. Until quite recently, chip design has indeed remained 
heavily concentrated, both geographically and organizationally. Geographically, chip design was 
restricted to a few centers of excellence, mainly in the US, but also in Europe and Japan. 
Organizationally, three types of firms dominated chip design: system companies (like IBM or 
Philips) that are captive chip producers; integrated device manufacturers (like Intel) that produce 
high-volume integrated circuits (ICs); and “fabless” chip design houses (like Xilinx or Altera) 
that target specialized niche markets. However, fundamental changes have occurred over the last 
few years in the location of chip design that are signaling a growing mobility. Of particular 
importance has been a massive geographic dispersion of chip design to leading Asian electronics 
exporting countries. Taiwan has emerged as a primary new location, with Korea following 
closely behind, and chip design is rapidly growing in China and India, as well as in Singapore 
and Malaysia.  
This paper explores why chip design is moving to Asia, despite its high knowledge-intensity. 
I distinguish “pull” and “push” factors. “Pull” factors are differences in the cost of employing a 
chip design engineer across locations that result from comparative factor and resource 
advantages, and from support policies that provide incentives and “public goods”
2. Pull factors 
are important - they explain what attracts chip design to particular locations. However, they 
cannot explain under what conditions physical proximity can become a disadvantage rather than 
an advantage for innovative activities that involve highly complex technological knowledge. A 
                                                           
1 This paper draws on discussions with the late Keith Pavitt, as part of an email correspondence on his manuscript 
“Are systems designers & integrators “post-industrial” firms?” (Pavitt, 2003 a) during the fall of 2002. The author 
gratefully acknowledges comments and suggestions from William Lazonick, Mike Hobday, Norio Tokumaru, 
Stefano Brusoni, David Levy , Boy Luethje, Shin-Horng Chen, AnnoLee Saxenian, Ismail Zawawi, Anna Ong, 
Grant Martin, Barry Naughton,  
2 For instance, chips designed by foreign and domestic companies in China are eligible for a 14% VAT tax rebate, 
which lowers the effective tax rate to 3%, from the nominal VAT of 17% on sales of imported and domestically 
produced chips (iSupply, 2003: 41, quoting State Circular # 18, amended in September 2001). This policy obviously 
creates a powerful artifical cost advantage for domestically designed chips. 
  1central proposition of this paper is that Pavitt’s conceptualization of cognitive and organizational 
complexity can help to explain what forces are behind the growing geographic mobility of chip 
design, pushing for and enabling its dispersion to Asia
3. 
Specifically, I argue that chip design is moving to Asia in response to radical changes in 
design methodology (“system-level integration” through “modular design”) and organization 
(automated “design factory”). Both changes have been introduced to improve design 
productivity and to cope with growing complexity at two levels of chip design: on the chip 
(“silicon”) and on the “system”
4. However, as so often happens in the history of innovation, de 
facto impacts fail to match with expectations. We will see that both changes in methodology and 
organization have further increased the cognitive and organizational complexity of design. As a 
result, it is now less likely that a single company will exclusively handle all stages of design for 
a specific chip. Instead, many companies are contributing, based upon their specific areas of 
expertise. In short, integrated forms of design organization, where (almost) entire ICs are 
designed within a single firm, are giving way to vertical specialization where stages of chip 
design are outsourced to other firms (dis-integration of firm organization) and relocated across 
national boundaries (geographic dispersion).  
But vertical specialization does not imply that the “Visible Hand” of large global corporations 
will become invisible (as argued, for instance, in Langlois, 2001), giving rise to a resurgence of 
market forces
5. I will show that network integration is the necessary complement to vertical 
specialization
6. Global corporations (the “network flagships”) integrate geographically dispersed 
companies (the “network suppliers”) that are contributing to the complete solution of a particular 
chip design project into hierarchical global design networks (GDNs)
7. Vertical specialization 
increases the number and variety of network participants, as well as the variety of business 
models, which in turn increases the organizational complexity of these networks. The main 
purpose of GDNs is to facilitate the reuse of design building blocks, the so-called “silicon 
intellectual properties” (SIPs). Hence, knowledge-sharing is the glue that keeps these networks 
growing. 
These propositions are based on interviews that I conducted during 2002 and 2003 with a 
sample of 60 companies and 15 research institutions that are involved in chip design in Taiwan, 
Korea, China and Malaysia. The sample includes ten strategic groups of firms (both global and 
regional players) that participate in GDNs: system companies; integrated device manufacturers 
(IDMs); providers of electronic manufacturing services (EMSs) and design services (the so-
called ODMs, or “original-design-manufacturers); “fabless” chip design houses; “chipless” 
licensors of “silicon intellectual properties” (SIPs); chip contract manufacturers (“foundries”); 
vendors of electronic design automation (EDA) tools; chip packaging and testing companies; and 
                                                           
3 In a companion paper, Ernst (forthcoming b), I will examine the role that Asian government policies and public 
institutions have played in fostering and upgrading local design capabilities. 
4 “Silicon complexity” refers to malfunctions that result from the growing scale and density of the circuit and the 
introduction of new materials or design architectures. “System complexity” on the other hand increases with the 
transition to system-level design with “exploding” multiple functions, like in smart phones (ITRS, 2002: 82,83). 
5 For a robust critique, see Pavitt, 2003b, Brusoni, 2003, and Tokumaru, 2003. See also van Assche, 2003, who 
demonstrates that vertical specialization may co-exist with re-integration through hierarchical cross-border 
corporate networks, using an industry-equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and perfect contracts. 
6 For the underlying conceptual framework, see Ernst (1997, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, and 2003c). 
7 A focus on vertical specialization  within GDNs distinguishes this paper from Linden and Somaya (2003) who 
juxtapose “integrated” and “licensing” modes of design organization to compare their relative transaction costs. 
While that article contains many interesting observations, the authors get trapped by their narrow focus on the 
“hierarchy-versus-network” dichotomy.  
  2design implementation service providers; and institutes and universities (both private and 
public)
8.  
To tell this story, I proceed in four steps. Part 1 reviews evidence on the evolution of  chip 
design to Asia, to establish what stages and capabilities have been dispersed to this region, and 
who are the main carriers of design relocation. The rest of the paper explores how changes in the 
methodology and organization of chip design have increased both cognitive and organizational 
complexity, and why this facilitates the relocation of design to new, lower-cost locations in Asia. 
In part 2, I will examine how intensifying pressures to improve design productivity, combined 
with increasingly demanding performance requirements for electronic systems have produced an 
upheaval in design methodology, the so-called “system-on-chip“ (SoC) revolution”
9. In part 3, I 
will explore attempts to adjust the organization of design, so that the new methodologies can 
produce the expected results. Specifically, I will look at changes in skill requirements and work 
organization and at attempts to reduce the so-called behavioral and cultural barriers (or in plain 
words: resistance) to the reuse of design knowledge. Part 4 asks why vertical specialization takes 
place within GDNs. I demonstrate that these networks are necessary to manage multiple design 
interfaces that reflect the growing complexity of  SoC design. I also highlight enabling forces 
that are gradually reducing constraints to the diffusion of chip design to Asia. 
 
1. Evolution of Chip Design in Asia 
The emergence of East Asia as a global export manufacturing base during the last decades of 
the late 20
th century is one of the few success stories of Third World industrialization
10. In 
electronic hardware manufacturing for instance, five Asian countries (China, Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Malaysia) account for over one quarter of world production. Furthermore, while 
India has failed to excel as a global manufacturing exporter, the country has firmly established 
itself as a global export production base for software and information services. 
Over the last few years, something new has happened. In the midst of  a global downturn in 
the electronics industry, Asia’s leading exporting countries appear to have seized upon new 
opportunities to create commercially successful innovations in the production of hardware, 
software, and services (Amsden and Tschang, 2003; Ernst, 2003 b and 2004a). Of particular 
importance are attempts to enter the global market for chip design. These attempts are poorly 
understood and under-researched.  
All standard data sources for the global chip design industry
11 confirm that a massive 
relocation of electronics design is under way to the above Asian countries. For instance, Asia 
                                                           
8 In China, the firm sample includes state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective enterprises, and private technology 
firms. 
9 See the titles of two influential  chip design text books that document the basic principles and the evolution of SoC 
design: “Surviving the SOC Revolution…” (Chang et al, 1999) and “Winning the SoC Revolution” (Martin. and H. 
Chang, eds., 2003) . 
10 e.g., Hobday, 1995; Mathews and Cho, 2000; Amsden and Chu, 2003; Ernst and O’Connor, 1992; Ernst, 
Ganiatsos and Mytelka, 1998; Ernst, 2000. 
11 The paper draws on the following data sources: interviews with the sample of companies described above; 
various editions of the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS), published by the US 
Semiconductor Industry Association, together with the associations of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Europe (especially 
ITRS 2002 and 2004); commercial consulting surveys, prepared by Gartner/Dataquest, the Electronic Engineering 
Times, iSuppli, and IBS; company reports ( e.g. 10K, 20F, Datamonitor, etc); and reports and data provided by 
public research institutes and support institutions in the US and the above Asian countries . In China, this includes 
the China Centre for Information Industry Development (CCID) at the Ministry of Information Industry; the 
Ministry of Science & Technology; the Shanghai Research Center for Integrated Circuit Design, and Science Park 
policy planning departments in Beijing, Shanghai, Suzhou, Hangzhou and Nanjing. In Taiwan, this includes the 
Institute for Information Industry (III), relevant divisions of the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), 
e.g., the Electronic Research & Service Organization and the System-on-Chip Technology Center, as well as such 
  3(excluding Japan) is the fastest growing market for EDA (= electronic design automation) tools, 
growing 24% in 2000, compared with 6% growth in North America, 13 % in Europe, and 17% in 
Japan (iSuppli, 2001). A survey conducted in January 2003 suggests that, excluding Japan, 
Asia’s share in the global production of chip designs has increased from practically nothing 
during the mid 1990s to around 30% in 2002, relative to North America’s share of  60% 
(iSuppli, 2003: 21). Over the five years until 2008, Asia’s share is projected to grow to more 
than 50%. Such projections are in line with a widespread consensus in the industry, confirmed in 
the author’s interviews, that “the center of gravity of the global semiconductor industry …  (is 
rapidly shifting, DE) …to the Asia-Pacific region “
12, primarily centered on “Greater China”, 
Korea and India. 
 
1.1. Stages of Design 
But such broad-brush figures tell us little about what stages of design are involved, and who 
are the main carriers of design relocation. Based on a widely used flow chart for chip design, 
Chang and Tsai (2002) provide a useful classification into “system/application specification“ 
(the three shaded boxes in the upper part of the figure) and “design implementation” (the six 
boxes in the middle of the figure that are un-shaded)  (see Figure 1). I use this distinction to 
highlight two important features of chip design in Asia. First, it has a much longer history in 
Asia than is generally known. And, second, while design implementation has played a dominant 
role, system specification has started to gain in importance over the last few years. 
 
Figure 1: Taiwan’s Competitive Advantage in Digital Circuit Design 
 
Note however that the distinction between design implementation and system specification 
cannot be used to distinguish design stages by knowledge complexity.  Of course, system 
specification provides leverage for defining global standards and for innovation rents via 
premium pricing. However, as will be explained below, it does not necessarily require more 
complex knowledge than design implementation. Knowledge complexity depends on how much 
functionality is squeezed onto the chip, the printed circuit board, or the system. Equally 
important is the sophistication of the design methodology. Knowledge complexity tends to 
increase substantially for the six design implementation stages, the closer chip design is moving 
from the individual component to system-level integration, and the greater use is made of 
“modular design”. 
 
1.2. History: Carriers of Asian Chip Design 
Electronic design in Asia started during the early 1980s with board-level design performed in 
Asian computer and consumer electronics companies (primarily in Korea and Taiwan) to provide 
the optimum in the circuit layout of discrete components (including ICs, capacitors, inductors, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
institutions as the National SOC Research Program (Si-Soft) at the National Chiao Tung University, the Taiwan 
Semiconductor Industry Association; the National Science Council; and the Bureau of Industry, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. In Korea, this includes institutions like the relevant policy planning divisions of the Ministry of 
Information and Communication (MIC) and of the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI). 
In Kuala Lumpur, I am to Dato Prof. Dr. Zawai Ismail, director, Commerce Asset Ventures, who has set up 
brainstorming sessions with relevant government agencies and venture capital firms. In Penang, I am indebted to 
discussions with Tan Sri Dr. Koh Tsu Koon, Chief Minister of Penang, Dato Dr. Toh Kin Woon, Penang State 
Executive Councillor, Mr. Boonler Somchit, Executive Director of the Penang Skills Development Centre (PSDC), 
Dr.Ganesh Rasagam, CEO, DCT Consultancy Services, and Dr. Anna Ong, Senior Analyst, Socio-Economic and 
Environmental Research Institute (SERI).  
12 Ray Bingham, president and CEO of Cadence Design Systems Inc, one of the leading vendors of electronic 
design automation (EDA) tools, quoted in Electronic Engineering Times, 28 February 2003 
  4resistors) and their interconnecting ‘wires’ on a printed circuit board (PCB)
13 (Ernst and 
O’Connor, 1992, chapter IV). Note that, while design complexity is low for a simple single-layer 
board, it rises substantially for very complex multi-layer boards (some up to 18 or 24 layers, for 
notebooks). Combined with the experience in detailed product design and engineering that Asian 
firms have accumulated in the fabrication of high-precision components (like ICs), board-level 
design has given rise to a broad portfolio of design implementation capabilities. This explains 
why today Asian original-design manufacturers (ODMs) like HonHai, Mitac, Delta and Acer 
from Taiwan, NamTai from Hong Kong, and dozens of other Asian companies are able to 
compete successfully with the leading US-controlled global electronic manufacturing services 
(EMS) providers, like Flextronics or Solectron (Ernst, 2003a).  
A third carrier of Asian design capabilities are fabless chip design start-up companies, 
especially from Taiwan like Etron, Via, or MediaTek. When these companies first entered the 
market, during the late 1980s, they were focused on semi-custom or ASIC design, where the goal 
was to avoid the very high cost and time required to design a full-custom IC
14. An important 
catalyst was the establishment of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) in 
1987 as a provider of contract chip fabrication (“silicon foundry”) services for “chipless” design 
companies. This enabled Taiwanese chip design start-ups to gain privileged access to a low-cost, 
high-speed supporting manufacturing system that encompasses both assembly and test, and 
wafer fabrication.  
An equally important enabling factor for the entry of Asian chip design houses was the 
emergence of global EDA (=”electronic design automation”) tool vendors (like Synopsys, 
Cadence and Mentor). ASIC design required well-defined procedures to develop and use cell 
libraries that contain design modules. To do this cost-effectively, a new design methodology was 
developed where the design requirements were implemented in a software language that 
described digital circuits at the so-called register-transfer level (RTL) (see again Figure 1). To 
implement this new design, access to increasingly sophisticated EDA tools was critical. As these 
tools were available on the market, albeit at a very high price, this provided entry opportunities 
for Asian design companies. And as the effective use of these tools always require substantial 
tweaking and adjustments, these Asian companies were able to accumulate a broad set of 
capabilities related to the implementation of these increasingly automated design methodologies. 
Relying on foundries and EDA tools enabled Asian, and especially Taiwanese design 
companies to concentrate their limited resources on pursuing a consistent niche strategy. The 
focus has been on design implementation and on organizational innovations that make it possible 
to reap as much benefits as possible from competitive strengths in speed, cost, flexibility and 
quality (Chang and Tsai, 2002). This has resulted in a rapid growth of Taiwan’s fabless chip 
design industry, producing a 31% compound annual growth rate between 1995 and 2001
15. In 
March 2003, a survey conducted by EETimes identified 234 Taiwanese chip design companies 
(Nanda, 2003). Five of the top 20 worldwide fabless companies are from Taiwan; and two 
Taiwanese design houses have moved up to the number 5 and 6 spot, capturing 16% of total 
fabless revenues.  
 
 1.3. Upgrading of Design Capabilities 
                                                           
13 A printed circuit board (PCB) is an internally wired, typically rectangular, substrate which holds a number of 
electronic components.  The internal wiring is accomplished through a series of photolitographic processes when 
the PCB is manufactured. 
14 An ASIC typically is composed of standard building blocks called “cells” that are designed to implement a 
specific customer application. 
15 During 2001, Taiwan’s chip design industry’s revenue growth was 18%, significantly outpacing the almost flat 
growth of the global chip design industry (ITRI, 2002) 
  5 All strategic groups in our interview sample have invested in chip design-related activities in 
Asia over the last few years, and/or are planning to expand such activities. While there are no 
systematic data on investment outlays and type of design activities, the interviews produced 
three general findings. First, global firms are expanding and upgrading their design centers in 
Asia as part of their GDNs. They consider the lower annual cost of employing a chip design 
engineer in Asia (between 10 and 20% of the cost in Silicon Valley (figure 2) to be an important 
pull factor. Additional pull factors include attractive tax rebates, a skilled and re-trainable 
workforce as well as easy access to foundry, assembly and testing services, and proximity to 
higher-end specialized network suppliers of components, manufacturing services and 
knowledge-intensive business services, especially design and engineering support services. 
 
Figure 2: Annual Cost of Employing a Chip Design Engineer (US-$), 2002 
 
Specific motivations differ across sectors and strategic groups. For mobile communication 
systems for instance, all major global system companies are expanding their Asian chip design 
centers to establish their own reference or “platform” designs
16 as de facto standards in the 
region. This reflects the growing importance of Asia as a major growth market for electronics 
products and services. As a result, global brand leaders in the electronics industry, like Intel, 
Microsoft, and Cisco, attempt to push their “platform leadership” strategies into Asia
17.  
Second, leading Asian system companies (especially from “Greater China”, Korea and India) 
are emerging as new sources of chip design, as part of their strategies to establish themselves as 
new sources of innovation and global standards. This includes innovations in process technology 
for electronic components (especially semiconductors and displays), where Korean and 
Taiwanese firms are among the industry leaders. But it also includes system specification (as 
defined in figure 1): Asian firms are now producing innovations in the design of complex system 
architectures
18 in sectors like digital consumer systems, wireless telecommunication systems, 
and business process software.  
For instance, in consumer electronics, there are joint efforts by China and Taiwan to develop 
a new video-disk technology format, called EVD (enhanced versatile disk) that would allow 
resolution five times higher than the current de facto industry standard DVD, while helping 
China’s consumer electronics industry to escape full royalty payments to the dominant DVD 
licensing groups. Beijing E-World Technology, a consortium of 10 Chinese DVD manufacturers, 
is conducting government-sponsored research, in collaboration with Taiwan’s Industrial 
Technology Research Institute (ITRI), and Taiwanese disk makers and chip design houses.  
                                                           
16 The concept of “platform design” was first developed in the car industry, under the heading of “modular design” 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). To deal with increasingly demanding cost reduction 
pressures, car manufacturers used a common template architecture for  different car models, allowing the sharing of 
molds and common elements, the “design modules”. This design methodology was then applied to other industries, 
including the computer industry (Langlois and Roberston, 1992).  In the semiconductor industry, “platform design” 
is an organised method to reduce the time required and risk involved in designing and verifying a complex system-
on-a-chip (SoC), by heavily and systematically reusing as many design steps as possible (Chang, 2003:23).  
17 “Platform leadership” strategies are defined by decisions on the “system architecture (the degree of modularity), 
interfaces (the degree of openness of the interfaces to the platform), and intellectual property (how much 
information about the platform and its interfaces to disclose to outside firms)” (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002: 40).  
18 Computer designers use the term “architecture” to refer to “the partitioning of the … (computer) … system into 
components of a given scope and related to each other functionally and physically through given interfaces. From a 
given architecture flows the design of components’ functions and how they relate to each other…” (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2002: 18). These authors compare a system architecture with a geographic map, where the components 
of the system are the countries’ territories and the interfaces between components are the countries’ borders 
(ibid.:19).   
  6In telecommunications, Korea’s four leading players (Samsung, SK Telecom, KT, and LG) 
are all engaged in serious efforts to become major platform and contents developers for complex 
technology systems, especially in mobile communications. These efforts can build on 
considerable capabilities, accumulated in public research labs (like the Electronics and 
Telecommunications Research Institute, ETRI), as well as in R&D labs of the chaebol, to 
develop complex technology systems like TDX (a switching system) and communication 
systems that are based on the CDMA (= code-division multiple access) standard.  
Furthermore, China’s attempt to develop an alternative third generation (3G) digital wireless 
standard, called TD-SCDMA (time-division synchronous code-division multiple access), has 
created a powerful motivation to expand Asian electronic design activities for all strategic 
groups in our interview sample. The TD-SCDMA standard was developed by Datang Telecom, a 
Chinese state-owned enterprise, and the Research Institute of the Ministry of Information 
Industry, with technical assistance from Siemens
19.  To accelerate the implementation of this 
strategy, Datang has formed a series of collaborative agreements: a joint venture with Nokia, 
Texas Instruments, the Korean LG group, and Taiwanese ODM (= original design 
manufacturing) suppliers; a joint venture with Philips and Samsung; and a licensing agreement 
with STMicroelectronics that will provide the Chinese company with access to critical design 
building blocks.  
And third, as chip and system design are expanding in Asia, this creates significant new entry 
possibilities for Asian specialized suppliers of a broad array of design implementation services. 
As we will see below, this reflects the combined impact of radical changes in design 
methodology and organization, and of the huge implementation problems involved in 
transferring these methodologies and organizational structures to distant locations. As the six 
non-shaded boxes in the middle of figure 1 demonstrate, there are multiple possibilities for 
segmenting the market for design implementation services, providing ample opportunities for 
niche market entry strategies for mid-sized companies. 
In short, there is reason to believe that the development of Asian chip design capabilities has 
passed a critical minimum threshold. Of course, global R&D remains highly concentrated - 85% 
takes place in only seven industrialized countries, with the U.S. occupying the leading position 
with 37% (Dahlman and Aubert, 2001, p.34). For instance, China’s total R&D spending is about 
$ 11billion, compared to more than $233 billion for the US. And the R&D budget of a U.S. 
industry leader, Microsoft, at around $ 6.2 billion (for 2003), exceeds 56% of China’s total R&D 
budget. Nevertheless, there are clear signs that Asia’s leading electronics exporting countries are 
entering the “global innovation race” (Baumol, 2002). In a handful of emerging centers of 
excellence in Asia, sophisticated innovation and research capabilities appear to have followed 
the earlier development of electronics manufacturing capabilities. This is likely to add further to 
the development of Asia’s chip design capabilities. Let us now turn to possible explanations that 
result from current changes in design methodology and organization, and from the spread of 
global design networks (GDNs). 
 
2. System-on-Chip (SoC): Upheaval in Design Methodology 
Over the last few years, intensifying pressures to improve design productivity, combined with 
increasingly demanding performance requirements for electronic systems have produced an 
upheaval in both design methodology and organization. Under the label of “system-on-chip“ 
(SoC) design, radical changes in the methodology of design attempt to combine  “system-level 
integration” on a chip with “modular design” and “design automation”. This is expected to 
                                                           
19 Approval by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) was granted in August 2000. The two dominant 
competing global 3G standards are W-CDMA (compatible with existing GSM operations, and supported by 
European firms), and CDMA 2000 (compatible with existing CDMA operations, and supported by US firms). 
  7facilitate the reuse of design building blocks, the so-called “silicon intellectual properties” 
(SIPs). In turn, these new methodologies require drastic changes in organization. There are 
attempts to transform an erstwhile loosely organized artisan-type activity into a highly 
routinized factory-type operation where most design stages can be automated.  
I first review the new challenges for chip design that result from a widening productivity gap 
between design and fabrication, and from increasingly demanding performance requirements. I 
then examine changes in design methodology and tools that are emerging in response to the 
above two challenges. Throughout this analysis, I will highlight how changes in design 
methodology have increased both cognitive and organizational complexity, pushing for 
geographic dispersion.  
 
2.1.New Challenges 
A widening productivity gap between design and fabrication has been a primary driver behind 
changes in design methodology and organization. While the productivity of semiconductor 
fabrication over the last twenty years has seen a 58% compounded annual growth, the 
productivity of chip design has lagged behind, with only a 21% compounded annual rate (Figure 
3). According to the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors 2001, the bible of 
the semiconductor industry, the spiraling cost of design is the greatest threat to a continuous 
growth of this industry (ITRS, 2002: 81). Design costs massively outpace the cost of chip 
manufacturing. Manufacturing costs for chips, the so-called non-recurring engineering costs 
(NREs) that cover masks and probe card, are exceeding $ 1 million. However design-related 
NREs routinely reach tens of millions of dollars, with design shortfalls being responsible for 
massive corrections in fabrication that multiply manufacturing NRE. 
 
Figure 3: Widening Design Productivity Gap in Integrated Circuits 
 
There is also an important time dimension to this gap. Time-to-market is of critical 
importance in the semiconductor industry, as rapid technology change shortens product-life-
cycles. Again there is a growing imbalance between manufacturing and design. Manufacturing 
cycle times are measured in weeks, with low uncertainty. However, design and verification cycle 
times are measured in months or years, with high uncertainty. In the end, the design productivity 
gap reflects a growing gap between process and design technology. Over the last years, the 
number of available transistors has grown faster than the ability to design them meaningfully 
(ITRS 2002: 81). Miniaturization has resulted in chips of sub-micron feature size - it is now 
possible to fabricate millions of transistors on a single chip. The challenge for chip design thus 
“…lies not in making the densest of chip but in filling up the vast area of silicon that is now 
offered.”
20 The resultant increase in design complexity must be matched by an equally dramatic 
improvement in design implementation productivity (ITRS 2004: 13,14). 
However, investment in process technology has by far outpaced investment in design 
technology. And, most disturbingly, the cost of design keeps growing exponentially, reflecting 
increasingly complex design requirements (Figure 4). For instance, $ 22 million are required to 
implement a 20 million gate design at the 90 nanometer (nm) process technology (IBS 2002: 67). 
This estimate covers “only” the cost for designing the hardware, from generating the 
specifications to delivering the validated prototype. To this needs to be added the increasing 
share of software costs. At the 90 nm level, the software design costs are substantially higher 
than hardware design costs, i.e. $ 30 million out of a total of $ 52 million
21. As global silicon 
                                                           
20 Email to the author  by Prof. Ismail Zawawi, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 3, 2002.  
21 Other estimates, presented at the 2003 International Symposium on the Quality of Electronic Design (ISQED) 
point an even bleaker picture of SOC design costs spiraling out of control to reach $ 80 million for an “ambitious” 
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capabilities (IBS 2002: 57), this indicates a huge potential for outsourcing to emerging lower-
cost software clusters in Asia. 
 
Figure 4: Costs of Implementing New Designs 
 
An equally demanding challenge for chip design are the increasingly demanding performance 
requirements for electronic systems. This has substantially raised both the cognitive and the 
organizational dimensions of design complexity, very much in line with Pavitt’s 
conceptualization. The key to success in chip design is a capacity to do two things 
simultaneously: to be first in using leading-edge process technology to produce the lowest-cost 
device, and to design differentiated performance features that meet real needs. To find out what 
are real needs requires permanent and very intense interaction with customers, end-users and 
other relevant market participants. Identifying user needs has become more challenging. One 
reason is that the PC sector has lost its erstwhile dominant position as the main driver of chip 
demand, producing more segmented and differentiated demand patterns. A second important 
reason is that major growth markets, as well as test-bed and launch markets are no longer 
restricted to the US, Western Europe and Japan, but include now markets in Singapore, Korea, 
India, and especially Greater China. 
The convergence of digital computing, communication and consumer devices has produced a 
variety of electronic systems that all strive to become lighter, thinner, shorter, smaller, faster and 
cheaper, as well as more multi-functional and less power-consuming. Time compression is 
essential in designing chips for such systems. As product life cycles for electronic systems 
become shorter and shorter, in many cases as short as a few months, chip design cycles of 
months or years are no longer acceptable. Performance requirements appear to be most 
demanding for portable, wireless, broadband, Internet switching, mass storage, and computers 
server systems. For instance, for portable and wireless systems, there is tremendous pressure to 
improve both size/weight ratios and battery life (ITRS, 2002: 61). Essential performance features  
are expected to double every two years, time-to-market is critical, and product-life-cycles are 
rapidly shrinking to a few months.  
As a result of these demanding performance requirements, chip design teams must cope with 
complex trade-offs that can easily spiral out of control into multiple vicious circles. For instance, 
optimization for clock speed needs to be combined with optimization for area, power 
consumption and production cost, while it is necessary to reduce overall design time and cost. 
Ensuring that a chip will run at the desired speed becomes substantially more difficult as 
transistor sizes move to 130 nanometer and below. In addition, with growing design complexity, 
design cycle time grows, and it becomes increasingly difficult for designers to incorporate the 
growing number of changes in design specifications that are typical for emerging and fast-
moving markets for chip applications, like mobile phones or digital consumer devices. To cope 
with this challenge would require a capacity for rapid adjustments in design. This however poses 
a strategic dilemma: How to balance trade-offs between design flexibility (which typically 
involves extra cost) and attempts to improve productivity? 
 
2.2.Changes in Design Methodology 
“Design methodology” is the sequence of steps by which a design process will reliably 
produce a design “as close as possible” to the design target, while maintaining feasibility with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
90nm SOC design, requiring 4 million lines of HDL code and a core team of at least 50 engineers ( “ISQED 
speakers propose profound changes in chip design”, 2003). 
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specification and constraints via top-down planning and search, with (2) a bottom-up 
propagation of constraints that stem from physical laws, limits of design and manufacturing 
technology, and system cost limits. Traditional design methodologies are no longer able to cope 
with the challenges that I have described before. Under the label of “SoC” design, there are now 
systematic attempts under way to enhance design methodology through a combination of 
“system-level integration” on a chip, “modular design” and “design automation”.  
In contrast to initial expectations, both cognitive and organizational complexity significantly 
increased as a result of attempts to move design from the individual component on a printed 
circuit board closer to system integration. As we will see in part 3, this growing complexity has 
created powerful pressures for vertical specialization: design teams had to be extended beyond 
the boundaries of the firm; they also had to be geographically dispersed across national borders. 
Attempts to increase the system level of chip design originated in Sematech, the U.S. 
consortium established to reinvigorate the American semiconductor industry. An important 
document that laid out in some detail key features of the SoC design concept has been the 
National Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors, published by Sematech in August 1994. 
Reflecting the pervasive globalization of this industry, this debate has rapidly proliferated 
internationally. Since 1998, this document has become the International Roadmap for 
Semiconductors (IRTS), which is now jointly published by the US. Semiconductor Industry 
Association, as well as by the by the relevant industry association of the European Union, Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan. 
  As befits such a drastic change in design methodology, initial expectations were very high. 
An influential study by the director of engineering of Synopsys, a leading EDA tool vendor, 
claimed that systematic and effective design reuse would reduce chip-development costs by 50% 
in three years and by more than 70% in six years, compared with the cost of developing chips 
without reuse (Keating, 1998)
22. In addition, an abundance of surplus venture capital during the 
“New Economy” bubble created a euphoric “race to higher integration”
23. However, the initial 
euphoria was soon followed by disappointment.  Since 1999, the annual number of chip design 
starts remained flat. To some degree, the stagnation in the number of new design starts reflects of 
course the move to SoC design: a shift to higher levels of system integration allows the contents 
of several ICs to be combined into one integrated SoC or into a more highly integrated system-
in-package (SiP). But the slow-down in the growth of the chip design market  was primarily due 
to a combination of two developments, one cyclical and one structural. The downturn in the 
global IT sector had a devastating impact: “…(F)uelled by the bursting of the “dot.com” bubble, 
the collapse of the grossly overvalued communications sector, and a fair degree of corporate and 
Wall Street shenanigans, …(the electronics downturn)… has brought gloom, layoffs, and 
collapse to a large part of the industry. IC design has been no exception.” (Martin, 2003: 9) 
An equally important structural cause was what industry insiders call the “SoC crisis”. It soon 
became clear that, while a shift to system-level design based on modularization is overdue, its 
implementation is going to be very, very difficult (e.g., Roberts, 2001; Claasen, 2003). To quote 
two chip designers of India’s WIPRO Technologies: “ while the potential is huge, the 
complexities are several, and countering these to offer successful designs is a true engineering 
                                                           
22 This however would require that by 2000 at least 50% of all chip design projects would rely on design reuse. The 
Synposys study emphasized that, without reuse of design modules, the cost of chip design would explode from $ 
3million per chip to $193 million. 
23  “No matter how much your design capital requirements were, if you had the right buzzwords in your business 
plan - heck, if you even had a business plan - you were encouraged to take more. So no one balked at pulling 
together a design team twice the size that anyone in the management had ever managed before” (“Low integration 
can up returns”, 2002). 
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produced quite mixed results. This is in line with Rosenberg’s well documented insight that the 
real impact of important innovations is seldom realized immediately, but requires countless 
iterations and re-combinations with other complementary innovations (e.g., Rosenberg, 1976: ch. 
11). 
This crisis in SoC design has worked as a powerful catalyst for attempts to reconsider existing 
strategies to reduce the design productivity gap. There is a growing recognition in the design 
community that, as long as the new design methodology is not well established, and as long as 
skills and design tools lag well behind increasingly complex design and verification 
requirements, SoC designers will face rising costs and entry barriers. In line with Pavitt’s 
conceptualization of cognitive complexity, verification and testing have become a critical 
bottleneck (Pavitt, 1999: p.X). With growing design complexity, it becomes necessary to verify 
early and frequently whether the SoC design can be produced at sufficiently high yield, and 
whether it will do what it is expected to do. Today, 60 to 70% of SoC hardware design time goes 
into verification, leaving only 30 to 40% for the actual device development. This obviously 
constrains considerably the productivity of design. Attempts to cope with this “verification 
crisis” emphasize the modularization of verification programs, to enhance the reuse of successful 
modules (“Solutions proposed for verification crisis”, 2002). In turn, this increases the pressure 
for vertical specialization. 
Overall, the emphasis of the debate has shifted from the benefits to the limits to system 
integration. According to a vice president for design at Motorola, “ a single-chip GSM handset 
would require three to four years, a 300-person design team and would be sadly uncompetitive.” 
(Ken Hansen, quoted in “SoC slam dunk still slightly out of reach”, 2003). This implies that 
system integration may work for some applications, but not for others. For each device, it is 
necessary to find the right balance along a continuum between the traditional board-level design 
and a single large and extremely complex SoC.  In addition, “…(n)ot only has the assumption 
that higher integration is mandatory been undermined, but the means to achieve it have been 
dissolved as well…If you are not self-funded then you’d better have at least one customer ready 
to make the rounds in Menlo Park with you.” (“Low integration can up returns”, 2002).  
After the bursting of the “New Economy” bubble, it has become very difficult and costly for 
design houses to win design-ins from global set makers. This reflects the extremely cautious 
approach of set-makers to new product development. For chip design, this implies that 
improving performance features (the main concern of set-makers) needs to be combined with a 
relatively conservative approach to design that helps to avoid low manufacturing yields
24. 
However, our interviews show that Asian system companies are more willing to use new and 
unconventional chip designs. Their main concern is whether these designs will enable them to 
reach their main objectives, i.e. to improve both speed-to-market and market penetration. This 
sets the Asian system companies apart from the global market leaders who are more cautious and 
unwilling to shoulder the higher costs and risks of innovative designs. As this signals a shift in 
the market for SoC designs to Asia, this may provide a further powerful incentive for global 
IDMs and design houses to relocate chip design to that region. 
 
2.3. Response: “Platform design” 
There is a growing consensus that, to turn the tide and to improve the benefits of system-level 
design, drastic improvements are required in design methodologies. All major actors in the 
semiconductor industry are now engaged in a process of searching for more effective design 
                                                           
24 This pressure to focus design on acceptable fabrication yields increases as yields tend to fall quite drastically with 
progressive process miniaturization (Edwards, 2003: 7) 
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to the system level, through “platform design” (Martin, 2003: 12-15; Chang, 2003, pp. 24 ff). 
Each SoC design requires all the steps shown in figure 5. However, by performing many of the 
steps only once across many similar SoC designs, platform design is expected to reduce the time 
required and risk involved in designing and verifying a complex SoC. Platforms design attempts 
to capture and reuse  the “best architectures and design approaches found for particular types of 
products and markets… (Platforms) “crystallize and harden these approaches for reuse by 
others.” (Martin, 2003: 13). 
 
Figure  5:  Overview of Steps in an SoC Design 
 
 
The overall result is a substantial increase in design complexity, which in turn fosters vertical 
specialization pressures. The move to platform-design thus is likely to enhance the spatial 
mobility of chip design. Once a library of  “best architectures and design approaches” exists for 
multiple design steps required for an SoC design, this can facilitate the exchange of knowledge 
“from more experienced design teams and architects to less experienced designers.” (Martin, 
2003: 13). Platform design thus facilitates the disintegration and geographic dispersion of design 
teams to multiple locations with different, yet complementary specialization profiles. Our 
interviews confirm that the shift to platform design may be accelerating the relocation of chip 
design to Asia. 
Platform design is shaped by the performance requirements of the electronic systems as well 
as the constraints imposed by the SoC design methodology and the design rules of foundry 
service providers. In addition, standards play an increasingly important role in dictating platform 
design. This has given rise to attempts by a growing number of global brand leaders in the 
electronics industry, like Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco, to develop “platform leadership” 
strategies
25. These strategies have two objectives: to avoid the very high costs and risks of trying 
to develop complex technology systems in-house; and to enhance and control patterns of 
innovation in an industry. The over-riding purpose of these strategies is to leverage the existing 
market power of industry leaders (the “global network flagships” in our terminology) into the 
control of “systemic architectural innovations” (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002: 39). A typical 
example  are Intel’s attempts to extend its control over microprocessors by creating widely 
accepted architectural designs that increase the processing requirements of electronic systems, 
and hence the market for Intel’s microprocessors.  
It is important however to emphasize that these strategies critically depend on vertical 
specialization, and that this may provide new entry possibilities for small network suppliers. To 
implement “platform leadership” strategies, a flagship like Intel needs to stimulate external 
innovations by independent specialized suppliers for a variety of components of this new system 
architecture. As long as “modular design” provides “open” interfaces between system 
components, Intel believes that “many more innovations could emerge from a computer industry 
organized in layers of specialized firms” (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002: 45) that design such 
hardware and software components. These platform-centered innovation networks initially were 
centered on the US. But, as we saw in part 1 of this paper, platform leaders like Intel are now 
rapidly expanding their chip design centers in Asia. 
An important impact of the move towards “platform design” is to increase vertical 
specialization at each step of chip design. Take “embedded software (ESW) design” which on 
average now requires two to three times the effort compared to hardware design. Software design 
                                                           
25 See note 17. 
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strategy at Philips Semiconductors, software is about to become the “next bottleneck” in SoC 
design: “the amount of software - for applications like multimedia cell phones, PDAs, and digital 
televisions - is increasing exponentially, while the efficiency of software design is not keeping 
pace.” (Claasen, 2003: 24) As we have seen before (Figure 4), this has produced a massive 
increase in the share of software design costs. If correct, these projections imply that pretty soon 
SoC design will become software design. This may well further facilitate the vertical 
specialization within chip design, as well as the geographic dispersion of design capabilities to 
the sprawling software engineering clusters in Asia, primarily  in India and Greater China.  
An important characteristic of ESW design is that it is much more demanding than developing 
application software for PCs (Chang, 2003: 28). As every PC user knows all too well, reliability 
and ease of use has not been a major concern for PC software. This is very different for ESW 
design. In addition to very tight cost constraints, user demands for reliability and ease of use are 
critical for devices like mobile phones or digital AV equipment. An important challenge is to 
overcome daunting legacy problems, to ensure portability, which is much more difficult to 
achieve for embedded products. This requires tedious work by highly skilled software engineers. 
These characteristics make ESW design a strong candidate for relocation to Asian software 
clusters. 
Finally, important changes are under way in the concept of “design platforms”. These changes 
reflect the rapid pace of change in the chip design industry, and they may create new entry 
possibilities for chip design in Asia. The traditional taxonomy of “design platforms”, reported in 
Linden and Somaya (2003: 18), distinguishes hard, firm and soft SIPs. Hard SIPs are provided as 
mask-level data that is adapted to the process technology of a particular foundry, and hence 
permits the fastest implementation. Soft SIPs however provide a more abstract description of 
architecture and algorithm with no physical layout, and hence provide much greater flexibility 
for adaptation to a specific application, enhancing the scope for product differentiation. But that 
advantage comes at a substantial cost, especially for smaller players: it takes much longer to 
implement soft SIPs, and licensing fees are much higher.    
A new taxonomy is emerging of vertical specialization through platform design distinguishes 
three configurations. “Full application platforms” provide a complete implementation vehicle for 
specific product domains, like for digital video applications (e.g., Philips) or for wireless devices 
(e.g., Texas Instruments). Such  “full application platforms” are attractive for Asian set makers 
who focus on rapid and aggressive market penetration. However, the development of such 
platforms is extremely costly and risky, leaving this as an option only for leading global players, 
like Samsung or, possibly China’s Haier and TCL. Platforms can also be “processor-centric”, 
where specialized global SIP suppliers like ARM, concentrate on the processor, its required bus 
architecture and basic sets of peripherals. Being more generic than the full application platform, 
they take less effort to develop, and they pose a lower investment risk for the SIP suppliers. But 
more work is required by the design house to turn such “processor-centric” platform into a SIP 
that can be effectively used in a specific SoC design. Finally, “reconfigurable platforms” 
(provided by global specialized suppliers like Xilinx and Altera) deliver core processors plus so-
called re-configurable logic along with associated SIP libraries and design tool flows (e.g., 
Lysaght,2003; Kempa et al, 2003). 
 
 
3. Changes in Design Organization  
In the search for solutions to the “SoC crisis”, most of the technical literature has focused on 
changes in design methodology and tools. However, there is a growing consensus that, for the 
new methodologies and tools to produce the expected results, fundamental changes are required 
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fundamental requirement is access to human resources. SoC design drastically changes the 
nature of design work: design is not just done faster, it is done differently by different people, 
and the relationship between designer and design is fundamentally altered by introducing vertical 
specialization. SoC design teams need to be able to recruit and retain highly experienced design 
engineers who master a portfolio of critical skills and capabilities. Such design talent is scarce 
everywhere, and hence SoC design teams need to recruit and retain them wherever they exist, 
and this is increasingly in Asia. 
I first highlight the quite drastic changes in design skill requirements, brought about by the 
transition to SoC design, and the transformation of design work organization into a factory-type 
operation. I will then examine attempts to reduce the so-called behavioral and cultural barriers 
(or in plain words: resistance) to these transformations, focusing specifically on the reuse of chip 
design knowledge. I argue that both changes in design organization are creating pressures to 
relocate design to new, lower-cost locations in Asia. 
 
3.1. Skill Requirements and Work Organization 
  A widely quoted study prepared for the Electronic Design Automation Consortium, highlights 
the “limited number of engineers available worldwide to implement complex designs” as a 
critical challenge for a successful transition to SoC design (IBS 2002: 13). One possible 
explanation may be a serious mismatch between the supply of skills in the existing designer 
population and the quite different skills required  by the transition from board-level to system-
level chip design
26. An equally important explanation may be a growing mismatch between what 
designers expect to earn and what design firms are willing and able to pay. During the “New 
Economy” boom of the 1990s, U.S. designers were used to receive generous stock options and 
other incentives. Since the downturn however, practically all strategic groups in our interview 
sample with non-Asian ownership have been exposed to intense cost-cutting pressures. In 
addition, SoC design requires a highly routinized, almost factory-type organization of design 
work, which is very much in contrast to the expectations and self-perceptions of IC designers in 
the US and Europe. For them what counts in their resumes is to have “authored” original 
“breakthrough designs” which, as we will see below, is very different from the daily routine of 
SoC design. 
  Skill requirements for SoC design share common features with ASIC design. A majority of  
the designer population however are board-level designers. The skills they have honed over the 
years in systems board design are very different from the new skill set required for SoC design. 
Some board-level designers may find niches  to survive in design teams of global set makers. But 
most board-level designers will have to go through a difficult process of unlearning and re-
learning. For instance, quality requirements are much more demanding: with SoC mask sets 
costing up to $ 1 million, design quality must adhere to “right first time” methodologies. While a 
board designer must be good in tweaking design prototypes, this is no longer possible with SoC 
design. Instead of tinkering, based on accumulated design experience, much more abstract 
thinking is required. A particularly demanding change in skill requirements is that SoC designers 
need to be much more open and knowledgeable about the use of software. At the same time, SoC 
designers need to be prepared to constantly learn and unlearn, as design methodologies are still 
in flux. This requires a willingness to adjust to abrupt changes in design procedures. 
In response to these changes in design skill requirements, a thriving market has emerged for 
design training and re-skilling services. The providers of such services include specialized 
                                                           
26 Unfortunately, while everybody in the industry talks about this so-called “designer bottleneck”, very little 
research has been done on possible causes.  
  14private training organizations and public research institutes
27. In fact, progressive vertical 
specialization within chip design can only produce expected results, if it is accompanied by a 
parallel process of re-integration and coordination through diverse public-private cooperation 
schemes that foster collaboration between university labs, industry and government agencies. 
Asia’s leading electronics exporting countries have been quick to develop their own set of 
private and public SoC design training institutions that could foster the development of new 
specialized chip and system design clusters (Ernst, 2004a; Ernst forthcoming a).  
The increasing complexity of SoC design requires massive changes in the organization of 
design work: an erstwhile loosely organized artisan-type activity needs to be transformed into a 
highly routinized almost factory-type operation. Board-level designers are used to work in small 
teams and to see a whole design through to completion. Yet, SoC designs tend to be done in very 
large teams, spread across different countries and time zones. The typical team size for an SOC 
design can range from 50 to 60 engineers (up from around 10 for board-level design), each 
designer with annual loaded cost of $250 K to $350K. And to complete an Intel processor design 
can take two years and involves thousands of people in different countries, which requires a 
highly structured and disciplined factory-type work process
28. This is so, because with growing 
team size and with geographic dispersion of design teams, coordination costs rise, comprising 
now around 20 to 30% of the total design implementation costs (IBS 2002: 67). 
To cope efficiently with these demanding coordination challenges requires design team 
managers with holistic “bridging capabilities” (author’s interview in major Taiwanese foundry, 
September 22, 2003) between the various disciplines involved in the different teams of an SoC 
design network. As this requires a robust understanding of the myriad operations involved in 
SoC design, these people are very difficult to find. In addition, there is a growing need for design 
“operations analysts”. Yet, in contrast to chip fabrication, there is limited progress in operations 
analysis for chip design. While there is a broad consensus that silicon-proven SIPs are critical, 
there has been little progress in operationalizing this concept. Benchmarking techniques for 
design performance are crude and under-developed
29. 
  In addition, chip designers love to produce complex breakthrough designs, by pushing the 
envelope of design methodologies. These ambitions are frustrated by the move towards more 
structured and conservative design approaches that emphasize incremental progress through the 
reuse of existing SIPs. Many designers complain that this “just doesn’t look great on a resume.” 
(author’s interviews with Taiwanese design company, September 2003). 
Most important however are changes in design procedures that reflect the tremendous 
pressures to improve design productivity. SoC designers must incessantly strive to cut cost and 
time-to-market for increasingly complex devices, which gives rise to an intense workload. 
“Bleeding-edge designers today confront 20 million-gate, six-level-metal design, in projects that 
may be divided among teams of 40 or 50 engineers. It’s not a job for the faint of heart.”(“SoC 
designers describe their ‘best practices’”, p.1). It is typical that SoC designers “work six days per 
                                                           
27 Private SOC design training firms are mushrooming in all major electronics industry clusters. As for public 
training institutions, the role model is Scotland’s Institute for System Level Integration (ISLI), based on the Alba 
campus outside of Livingston, which was formed specifically to train people for SOC design. The EC is offering 
advanced SOC design courses through SYDIC, a program under the auspices of ECSI, the European Electronic 
Chips and System Design Initiative. SYDIC coordinates the resources of organizations such as ISLI, IMEC , and 
also involves major EDA tool vendors. More recently, a group academics, assisted by industry is seeking EC funds 
to create a Europe-wide network of excellence for SOC development and engineering courses The initiative, named 
EuroSOC, brings together 210 SOC communities from 160 institutes, each with its own industry. 
28 Rudy Lauwereins, vice president of design technology at the Belgian microelectronics research institute IMEC, as 
quoted in Collins (2003:9) 
29 “In general, IC vendors either do not benchmark their design capabilities very thoroughly or the benchmarking 
efforts do not realistically assess their capabilities” (IBS, 2002: 56) 
  15week, twelve hours per day, with intense pressures to meet the time-to-market requirements for 
design” (IBS 2003: 42). Obviously a 72 hours work week will come at the cost of innovation, 
even if incentives through stock options are high. But as pressure grows in the U.S. to expense 
stock options, it is difficult to see why designers there would be willing to keep up with such 
health-destroying work loads. That may be different however in Taiwan and China, where the 
system of  personal income taxation enables semiconductor personnel to receive company stock 
and options as compensation in a manner which results in little or no actual income or capital 
gains tax being paid when the stock is sold. As a result,  Taiwanese and Chinese firms arguably 
“…have a competitive advantage (the lure of rapid personal accrual of substantial wealth) with 
respect to competition for talent that other firms cannot match.” (Howell et al, 2003: IV)
30 
 
3.2. Barriers to the Reuse of Design Knowledge 
A leading textbook on SoC design compares it with Henry Ford’s assembly line, with 
engineers putting systems (i.e., cars) together out of parts previously designed in another group, 
in another country, in another company (Chang et al, 1999, p.17). If this view were correct, this 
would indicate that the organization of chip design work somewhat belatedly follows a path 
trodden earlier by hardware manufacturing. 
However, a comparison with Fordism may be misleading. Engineers like to talk about “virtual 
components”, when they describe the design building blocks (the SIPs) that need to be 
exchanged between various participants in the interactive design process. But the real challenge 
posed by the transition to SoC design is to develop an organizational set-up that facilitates the 
exchange and reuse of design knowledge. Much of this knowledge exchange involves tacit 
knowledge, hence work organization needs to differ from traditional Fordism. Brute force cannot 
cope with the high transaction costs involved in exchanging very complex design knowledge. 
And rigid Fordist organizational principles would carry a high risk of obstructing speed-to-
market due to opportunistic behavior. While Fordist work organization focuses almost 
exclusively on cost reduction through scale economies, the reorganization of SoC design is 
expected to cope with increasing complexity, and to improve design productivity. It is thus 
hardly surprising that attempts to impose a Fordist work organization have made little progress. 
Where changes occurred, like in ASIC design cell libraries and in software object libraries, 
Fordism has been tampered with elements of flexible production.  
There is no doubt that cultural and behavioral barriers to the reuse of chip design knowledge 
are the most important constraints to the implementation of SoC design. To understand why, we 
need to address the puzzling question why proximity can be advantageous, but also 
disadvantageous for the reuse of complex design knowledge. 
Apparently, the reuse of design knowledge is spatially sticky: knowledge reuse works well, as 
long as this knowledge is embedded in individual designers, or small specialized design teams. 
One way to do this is to place everyone literally in one room.  The so-called “boiler room” 
model, where dense informal contacts between designers result from having coffee and lunch 
together, is unbeatable when the objective is to exchange complex tacit knowledge (Wilson, 
2003: 49). A second approach is the so-called “journey men” model, where successful design 
teams tend to stay together, moving as a group from one company to another, or to new 
locations. Sometimes, these design teams even tend to maintain the same SIP vendors from  job 
to job, “preserving interfaces that have evolved through trial and trouble and that have come to 
be trusted.” (Wilson, 2003: 62). 
                                                           
30 In Taiwan and China, employees of semiconductor firms who have received stock as compensation are taxed on 
the face value of the shares, not the market value - which is often many times higher than the face value, given the 
rapid growth of semiconductor firms in both countries. 
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experience with the processes, tools, and technology they used. But once another engineer or 
another engineering team is asked to reproduce this design, little productivity increase is 
observed. This shows that, in principle, the arguments for proximity and co-location of design 
remain as powerful as ever. The challenge for innovation theory is to explain why sometimes 
proximity also poses substantial disadvantages. 
One possible explanation may be that cultural and behavioral barriers to the reuse of design 
knowledge are deeply entrenched in particular localities. For instance, chip design engineers in 
the US have a tendency to invent wherever possible, rather than to simply reuse existing design 
modules (SIPs). This so-called “not invented here” syndrome is difficult to change, as it reflects 
the pride of an engineer who has found a more elegant design solution. Other such barriers 
include an unwillingness to accept a heavily constrained environment (a “design factory”), or an 
inability to create an acceptably constrained environment (Chang et al, 1999, p.18). In our 
interviews, global firms indicated that attempts to bypass persistent behavioral barriers to SoC 
design have played an important role for the relocation of design stages to Asia. 
 
3.3. Reuse of Design Knowledge - Alternative Models 
To overcome these barriers requires fundamental changes in organization as well as in 
geographic location. Reuse of knowledge can only work if adequate documentation exists, and if 
there are robust standards and procedures for knowledge exchange that prevent opportunistic 
misuse of shared knowledge. This necessitates a transition from personalized to more structured 
and formalized models of knowledge exchange. Without such organizational adjustments, 
designers are right to argue that learning and adapting what has been done elsewhere takes 
longer than starting from the original specification. 
To highlight this important issue, let us distinguish four alternative models of reuse of design 
knowledge: personal, source, core, and virtual components
31. In the personal reuse of design 
knowledge, that knowledge is embedded in individual designers or in small, homogeneous and 
largely self-contained design teams. Apart from the “not invented here” syndrome, two problems 
obstruct the effectiveness of knowledge exchange. First, it is difficult to retain key personnel, as 
top designers want to work on the next system rather than on what they perceive to be 
“derivates”. Second, there is also a danger that individual designers get too much attached to a 
particular technology, architecture or design methodology. Once the design house is forced to 
change any or all of these three features, this may significantly undermine design productivity. 
A limited reuse of general-purpose, unverified source files helps to address some of the 
weaknesses of the personal reuse of knowledge. However, it also carries many imponderables. 
For instance, this approach will only work, if the original designer is available to answer 
questions, a heroic assumption in an industry characterized by high job mobility, and, more 
recently, massive retrenchments. This second model of knowledge reuse also requires an 
openness of the adopting designer to use an existing design, rather than coming up with her own, 
presumably much more elegant solution. Further, the source model of knowledge reuse is 
normally hampered by insufficient documentation, with the result that the time to evaluate and 
understand what is available often takes longer than to produce an original design. 
The reuse of application-proven cores with a physical and project history attempts to 
overcome the last constraint. An improved database enhances documentation, and hence the 
scope for knowledge reuse. Reusable design building blocks can be drawn from a clearly 
specified design library. It now becomes possible to form multi-group, multi-disciplinary design 
groups, consisting of system designers, chip integrators, and so-called “block authors”, who 
                                                           
31 I draw on Chang et al, 1999, pages 18-25; ITRS 2002 and 2004  
  17create specific design blocks (SIPs). However, physical proximity is still an over-riding concern, 
as many iterative adjustments are required. 
The transition to virtual components brings us to a much higher degree of design 
modularization. “Virtual components” are design blocks that are available in the market, that are 
ready for reuse, and that have been successfully manufactured and used in relevant applications. 
In the parlance of design engineers, virtual components are “pre-characterized, pre-verified, and 
pre-modeled blocks….designed to target a specific virtual system environment” (Chang et al, 
1999, p. 24). Like hardware components, these virtual components can easily be exchanged, as 
they have been created and tested according to very demanding standards. It is expected that, by 
outsourcing virtual components, it will be possible to sustain a clear-cut separation between the 
creation (“authoring”) of a particular design block and the task of design implementation.  
In other words, knowledge reuse through “virtual components” is expected to reduce 
constraints to geographic dispersion, which would help to reduce resistance to emerging factory-
type forms of design organization. However, this would result in a highly unequal international 
division of labor, repeating earlier developments in the manufacturing sector, where cost-
sensitive value chain stages have moved out to low-labor cost locations. Within this framework, 
the established global centers of chip design excellence would be able to retain the creative parts 
of design (SIP authoring and system specification). And only “blue-collar” chip design 
implementation tasks would move to Asia.  
But, as we have seen in part 1 one the paper, this claim does no longer match with reality. To 
explain why, let us examine a new organizational model of chip design  that I call global design 
networks (GDNs). 
 
4. Vertical Specialization Within Global Design Networks  
  We have seen how radical changes in design methodology and organization have increased 
the cognitive and organizational complexity of chip design, creating a fertile ground for vertical 
specialization. Let us now turn to the final missing link of our argument: vertical specialization 
takes place within GDNs, and this in turn is facilitating the relocation of design to new, lower-
cost locations in Asia. 
  This argument runs counter to established wisdom. Much of the literature on “vertical 
specialization” (or “fragmentation in the parlance of trade economists
32) assumes that it results in 
a shift from “hierarchies” (vertically integrated multinational corporations) to “more reliance on 
arms-length transactions between firms in different countries” (Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001: 
36). For Langlois (2001), vertical specialization implies that the “Visible Hand” of large 
manufacturing firms will become invisible, enhancing the role of market forces. A key 
proposition of this literature is that “there is an increasing role to be played by separate firms 
(perhaps smaller than in the past) connected only by the rules of the international market place.” 
(Jones and Kierzkowski, 2000: 6).  
I will demonstrate that this proposition does not hold for chip design. I will first present 
empirical evidence that contradicts expectations that vertical specialization in chip design will 
enhance the role of market forces. Next, I place this question in a broader context, examining 
how the structure and the competitive dynamics of the global semiconductor industry has been 
transformed by vertical specialization through global production and design networks. I will then 
explore why GDNs are required to manage multiple design interfaces that reflect the growing 
complexity of SoC design. Finally, I will look at two enabling forces that are gradually reducing 
constraints to the diffusion of design knowledge to Asia: ICT-enhanced information 
                                                           
32 For example, Feenstra, 1998; Jones and Kierzskowski, 2000; Cheng and Kierzkowski, 2001 
  18management, and transnational knowledge communities that facilitate the exchange of tacit 
knowledge. 
. 
4.1. Licensing of SIPs 
Of critical importance for SoC design is the interface with SIP providers outside the SoC 
design team. There are three external sources of SIPs (Morris, 2003): (1) in-house SIP libraries 
that compile building blocks from previous designs; (2) other in-house design teams working in 
parallel with the main SOC design team; and (3) independent SIP vendors. 
During the initial euphoria of the late 1990s, there were widespread expectations that vertical 
specialization in chip design would lead to a highly fragmented market for SIPs, consisting of 
small SIP boutique shops. This perception is mirrored in the claim by Linden and Somaya (1993: 
545) that “we observe a burgeoning market for licensed DMs (= design modules, or SIPs in 
industry parlance, DE)”. In the conclusions of this article, the authors are struggling to support 
this claim. Linden and Somaya (2003: 571) state that “integrated modes currently enjoy the 
upper hand in SoC, primarily due to the initial distribution of industry assets and the lack of 
supporting licensing institutions at the dawn of the SoC era.”  They argue however that the 
balance may shift over time towards open market SIP licensing. 
Yet, empirical evidence demonstrates that the exchange of SIPs takes place primarily within 
global system companies and flagship-dominated GDNs (e.g., Martin, 2003:11; Goering, 2002). 
The global market for SIPs has remained relatively small (Figure 6). It consists primarily a few 
“star” IPs (MPUs, DSPs, memories and analog design blocks), dominated by a handful of 
specialized global suppliers like ARM, MIPS, Rambus, and DSP Group.  
 
Figure 6: The Global Market for SIPs, 2001 
 
In other words, initial expectations have not materialized that vertical specialization in chip 
design would lead to a highly fragmented market for SIPs, consisting of small SIP “boutique 
shops” (Goering, 2002). Instead SIP trade is dominated by a handful of global players. To do so, 
the flagships of GDNs must have the resources to coordinate, across boundaries, multiple design 
interfaces, and they must support a global sales force that can provide support services to 
customers wherever they are located.. 
In theory, the idea of reusing SIPs looks straightforward. A basic assumption is that the SoC 
designer ( the “user”) does not need to understand what drives the operations of the design 
building blocks that she works with. But in reality, this is often not the case, due to difficulties in 
defining the data, which obviously defeats the purpose of using SIPs. In the best of worlds (a 
favorite term of chip designers), the solution would be to talk to the original SIP design team, 
establishing a person-to-person contact between SIP creators (“block authors”) and SIP users 
(the SoC designers). In the real world of ruthless global competition, this is practically 
impossible. A global SIP provider like ARM, for instance, is normally supporting a number of 
clients at the same time, and the SoC team may well be dealing simultaneously with a number of 
SIP providers.  
A second-best approach is that both the SoC team and the SIP provider assign a single contact 
person (a customer support engineer at the SIP vendor, and an engineering manager on the SoC 
team) who can establish temporary connections between members of both teams to solve 
particularly difficult problems. Especially for complex projects, one often finds “ team members 
from one side moving into the other’s facility for extended lengths of time.” (Wilson 2003: 60). 
This again shows that proximity advantages continue to matter, even as vertical specialization of 
design keeps expanding. For design teams, this implies that they need to develop “second-best” 
management approaches that allow for the selective exploitation of proximity advantages, while 
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organizational model that attempts to solve this problem. 
 
4.2. Asymmetry: Vertical Specialization in the Global Semiconductor Industry 
Progressive vertical specialization has fundamentally transformed the structure and the 
competitive dynamics of the global semiconductor industry. As shown in Figure 7, vertical 
specialization is simultaneously driven by two main actors, the “global set makers” (or “system 
companies”) that dominate global brands for computing, communication and consumer devices, 
and the “silicon vendors”. The latter is a new term for semiconductor firms that captures their 
transformation from component suppliers with a core competency in process technology to 
vendors of silicon systems who increasingly focus on system-level design skills and capabilities.  
 
Figure 7:Vertical Specialization in the IT Industry 
 
Let us first look at the system level. Set makers have first outsourced manufacturing and 
design implementation services to (mostly US-controlled) electronic manufacturing service 
providers (EMSs) and, primarily Taiwan-controlled, original-design manufacturing service 
providers (ODMs) (Sturgeon, 2002; Luthje, 2002; Ernst, 2003 a; Ernst, 2004 b). Set makers are 
however now also engaged in the outsourcing of higher-end, more knowledge-intensive 
activities. They routinely source chip design from fabless companies, who have their chips 
fabricated by “foundries”. But set makers also buy in so-called “star” SIPs (i.e MPUs, DSPs, 
memories and analog design blocks). In some cases, set makers may also source for “design 
platforms”, especially when they either lack sufficient in-house capabilities, or where they are 
eager to rapidly expand market share. 
  The other side of the coin is vertical specialization pursued in the semiconductor industry. 
Competitive strategies in this industry are experiencing a fundamental shift from process 
technology to system-level design skills and capabilities
33. Silicon vendors now come in 
different incarnations. They can be “silicon foundries”, i.e. contract manufacturers of given chip 
designs. They also can be IDMs who, like Intel, keep much of  chip design and fabrication in-
house. However, the cost of keeping fabrication facilities running, let alone the cost of upgrading 
them, has risen exponentially. For instance, $ 3 billion and more is the current minimum 
investment outlay required for state-of-the art 12 inch fabrication plants, and these very high 
investment thresholds are continuing to rise. As a result, IDMs now cooperate in R&D and 
jointly build wafer fabs for the production of new chips, in an effort to control costs and risks. 
Some IDMs are attempting to reduce their exposure to fabrication. By outsourcing fabrication to 
“silicon foundries”, these IDMs have become so-called “fab-lite” firms, a model introduced by 
Motorola. More recently, vertical specialization has produced two new types of silicon vendors, 
the so-called SIP providers, and the so-called platform leaders, like Intel. But now also set 
makers have aggressively entered the market for platform leaders, blurring the erstwhile 
distinctive boundaries between set makers and silicon vendors. 
As a result, silicon vendors are increasingly being transformed into “systems solution 
providers that also sell the software” (Claasen, 2003: 20) System design and software 
development are migrating to silicon vendors, who need to shoulder a much higher share of the 
overall cost of developing electronic systems. As system-level architecture and architectural 
verification are now becoming an integral part of chip design, this dramatically increases its 
                                                           
33 With regard to process technology, most IDMs seem to lag behind the leading foundries, with the exception of 
IBM and Intel (IBS, 2002: 7). Most  IDMs can no longer rely on leading-edge process technology as their main 
strategic weapon; they need to develop strong system design and platform design capabilities.  
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set makers and silicon vendors need to rely on vertical specialization through GDNs. 
 
4.3. Managing Multiple Design Interfaces 
A good indicator of the growing organizational complexity of SoC design is the variety of 
design interfaces that need to be managed. An interface is created when information must flow, 
and when knowledge must be exchanged, “…between groups that are isolated from each other, 
whether by goals, methodologies, geography or culture” (Wilson, 2003: 49).  
This is exactly what is happening with SoC design. The diversity of functions that must be 
integrated into the chip means that “various blocks within the finished design will have come 
from different groups, some within and some outside the design team. Some of these groups will 
not be involved in the chip design process at all, and may not share a vocabulary, or even a 
language and culture with the primary chip design group.” (Wilson, 2003:48). A typical SoC 
design team needs to manage at least six main types of design interfaces (Figure 8): with system 
designers, with SIP providers, with software developers, with verification teams, with EDA tool 
vendors, as well as with foundry services (fabrication).  
 
Figure 8: Multiple SOC Design Interfaces 
 
In addition, these different design network communities are spread across the ten strategic 
groups that participate in GDNs that I have described at the beginning of this paper. Managing 
these multiple design interfaces poses extremely demanding coordination requirements. For 
instance, each of the different design network communities insists on using their own language 
and tools. Typically, in SoC design teams, there are “islands of automation” of different design 
tasks, each based on a different language. Nobody will easily give up the language or the 
approach used for their own particular task for the sake of the overall flow” (Pierre Bricaud, 
design manager at Mentor Graphics, quoted in “SoC designers describe their ‘best practices’”, 
2002). Attempts to adjust design tools and practices to overcome such communication gaps are 
important. But their effect will always depend on the quality of engineers. 
At the same time, there are powerful pressures to increase the codification of knowledge. As 
design teams become larger and geographically dispersed, “…(w)e capture as much as we can in 
automated flows, which are documented and posted on the web” (Mike Fazeli, design manager 
at Texas Instruments, quoted in “SoC designers describe their ‘best practices’”, 2002). To keep 
the design networks growing, it is necessary to develop more formal interfaces between the 
different network nodes. Design groups that are separated by distance or design disciplines need 
to be able to communicate with each other. While they share a common objective, they use 
highly dissimilar vocabularies. Defining interfaces requires shared definitions of the data that 
need to be exchanged, of the formats and protocols that govern data transfer and interpretation, 
and of the economic performance requirements of the designs. Developing a precise common 
vocabulary for these three interface attributes is extremely difficult. Equally important, data must 
be translated into a form usable by different design groups. Let us look at two illustrative 
examples of design interface management within GDNs: with system designers and with foundry 
services. 
By definition, SoC design requires close interaction with system designers, marketing people 
and end customers ( the “set makers”). With product life cycles often as short as six months or 
less, system design requirements keep changing. The protocol necessary to transmit these 
changes real-time to all the different design network participants is “one of the great unsolved 
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34. Hence, proximity and face-to-face 
contact are important. As we have seen, an important new development in Asia is that this region 
not only provides important growth markets for existing electronic products and services, but 
also test beds and launch markets for important innovations and global standards in mobile 
communications and digital consumer electronics. This implies that GDNs need to locate those 
chip design stages in Asia that strongly interface with Asia-based system designers. 
Interactions with foundry services are arguably the most explicitly recognized interfaces in 
the entire SoC flow, with well documented and automatically checkable “design rules” (Macher, 
Mowery and Simco, 2002) (Figure 9). Yet, with growing complexity of SoC design, the 
management of the foundry interface also poses new challenges (Wilson, 2003:62-65). A 
combination of new processes and drastic changes in design methodology implies that design 
rules need to be tweaked and stretched, and that process limitations are there “to be explored not 
worshipped” (Wilson, 2003: 63), requiring a much closer interaction between designers and 
process engineers. From the perspective of foundries, for instance, sub-micron process 
technology makes yield enhancement much more difficult for 20 to 50 million transistor SoCs 
(author’s interview with Taiwanese foundry, September 22, 2003).  
 
Figure 9: The Foundry Interfaces 
 
As processes grow more demanding, mask makers and process engineers will try to pass this 
growing complexity to the chip design team through an enormous increase in complexity in 
either cell selection or design rules. For instance, a leading-edge SoC design is likely to require 
22 separate cells. And the foundry’s process engineers now include into the design rules for SoC 
designers the request to “design-for-yield-enhancement.”  
This new interface requirement means that design teams must adjust the design to improve the 
odds that the process will yield well and that the dice will continue working even under 
demanding system performance requirements. In other words, designers must take into account 
the effects of fabrication process variations, which makes design even more complex. There is 
now a much greater need for dense interaction between physical designers and process 
integration teams, even for relatively stable designs. Designers increasingly must take into 
account the intricacies of process development. An “extraordinary degree of coordination” is 
required between SoC designers, mask makers, foundries, and third party SIP suppliers (“90-nm 
design flow is seen as a community effort”, 2003). As the world’s leading foundries are all based 
in Asia (see part 1), this creates powerful pressures for GDNs to relocate increasingly important 
stages of chip design to this region. 
In short, chip design has become itself a highly complex technology system, where multiple 
communication and knowledge exchange  interfaces must be managed simultaneously. While the 
idea of reusing SIPs is great, its implementation requires a degree of cooperation that was 
unthinkable even a few years ago. This is true for all the different design interfaces. Ironically, 
the more SoC design moves into sub-micron territory, the more the pendulum swings back 
towards a reintegration of design and manufacturing. 
This implies that, with the increasing complexity of interactive SoC design systems, 
geographic dispersion needs to complement reorganization: knowledge exchange must now 
extend beyond firm boundaries and national borders. SoC design requires a combination of 
                                                           
34 Communication is also fraught with problems between hardware and software designers: “Verilog representation 
of a block by hardware designers, for example, may need to be translated into …. a Java transaction-level model of 
the block for use by software designers.” (Wilson, 2003: 52). The amount of work required for this translation is 
enormous, so much depends on the availability of new software tools that would make a progressive automation 
possible. 
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diverse people at one location, and to keep it there, becomes increasingly costly. When spatially 
concentrated, such design groups also may become too powerful, and hence may constrain 
productivity growth. But once they become dispersed, this creates extremely demanding 
coordination requirements for managing multiple chip design interfaces. Neither complete 
localization nor complete vertical specialization through a shift to invisible market forces can 
cope with the challenges that result from increasing design complexity. An alternative is to 
develop GDNs that provide an efficient and flexible organizational environment for the 
exchange of design knowledge across diverse design communities that are not co-located. 
 
4.4. The New Mobility of Design Knowledge: Enabling Forces 
This brings me to my last question: What explains that GDNs are gradually reducing 
constraints to the diffusion of relevant design knowledge to Asia? Figure 10 provides a stylized 
model of how vertical specialization (i.e. the dis-integration of firm organization and the 
geographic dispersion across national boundaries) and re-integration of dispersed production, 
distribution and innovation bases into hierarchical global flagship networks facilitate knowledge 
diffusion (Ernst, 2003b and c). Figure 10 also demonstrates the role played by two 
complementary enabling forces in enhancing both codified and tacit knowledge exchange: ICT-
enhanced information management and transnational knowledge communities.  
 
Figure 10: Vertical Specialization, GFNs and Knowledge Diffusion 
 
Let us first look at the latter two enabling factors. In all Asian countries, but especially in 
China, earlier “brain drain” has produced overseas communities of engineers, scholars, and 
managers who are familiar with cutting-edge technology and best-practice management 
approaches and who understand the dynamics of international product and financial markets. 
These “transnational knowledge communities” can play an important catalytic role in the 
development of domestic innovative capabilities (Saxenian, 2002). 
The use of ICT as a management tool can enhance the scope for knowledge sharing among 
multiple network participants at distant locations (Ernst, 2003 c). But these changes will occur 
only gradually, as a long-term, iterative learning process, based on search and experimentation. 
The digitization of knowledge implies that it can be delivered as a service and built around open 
standards. This has fostered the specialization of knowledge creation, giving rise to a process of 
modularization, very much like earlier modularization processes in hardware manufacturing. 
While this paper has highlighted the substantial implementation problems, it is nevertheless true 
that the use of ICT-enhanced information management will facilitate the reuse of chip design 
knowledge through GDNs. 
Under the heading of “e-business”, a new generation of networking software provides a 
greater variety of tools for representing knowledge, including low-cost audio-visual 
representations (Foray and Steinmueller, 2001). Those programs also provide flexible 
information systems that support not only information exchange among dispersed network 
nodes, but also the sharing, utilization, and creation of knowledge among multiple network 
participants at remote locations (Jørgensen and Kogstie, 2000). New forms of remote control are 
emerging for various design stages, as well as the management of quality, supply chains, and 
customer relations. Equally important are new opportunities for the joint production, across 
different time zones, of complex chip designs. 
Let us now turn to the characteristics of global flagship networks (the central box in figure 
10), of which design networks (GDNs) are just one manifestation, complementing the global 
production networks (GPNs) that have been around for a much longer time. Trade economists 
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production as a determinant of trade patterns (for example, Feenstra, 1998; Jones and 
Kierzskowski, 2000; Cheng and Kierzkowski, 2001). Their work demonstrates that (i) 
production is increasingly ‘fragmented’, with parts of the production process being scattered 
across a number of countries, hence increasing the share of trade in parts and components; (ii) 
that there is reintegration through global production networks; and (iii) that countries and regions 
which have been able to become a part of these network are the ones which have industrialized 
the fastest.  
The model of GFNs builds on this work, but uses a broader concept that emphasizes three 
essential characteristics (Ernst, 2002a, 2002 b, 2003c): i) scope: GFNs encompass all stages of 
the value chain, not just production; ii) asymmetry: flagships dominate control over network 
resources and decision-making; and iii) knowledge diffusion: global corporations (the “network 
flagships”) construct these networks to gain quick access to skills and capabilities at lower-cost 
overseas locations that complement their core competencies. Flagships need to transfer technical 
and managerial knowledge to local suppliers to ensure that they meet the technical specifications 
mandated by the flagships. Originally this involved primarily operational skills and routine 
procedures required for sales and distribution, manufacturing and logistics. Over time, 
knowledge sharing also incorporates higher-level, mostly tacit forms of “organizational 
knowledge” required for control, coordination, planning and decision-making, as well as for 
learning and innovation (Ernst and Kim, 2002). 
Our research indicates that similar, albeit more complex mechanisms might be at work in 
global design networks. These networks integrate geographically dispersed companies that are 
contributing to the complete solution of a particular chip design project. The main purpose of 
GDNs is to facilitate the reuse of design building blocks, the so-called “silicon intellectual 
properties” (SIPs). Hence, knowledge-sharing is the glue that keeps these networks growing, 
facilitating the relocation of chip design to Asia.  
 
Conclusions 
  This paper has explored why chip design is moving to Asia, despite its high knowledge 
intensity. A central proposition is that Pavitt’s conceptualization of cognitive and organizational 
complexity can help to explain what forces are behind the growing geographic mobility of chip 
design, pushing for and enabling its dispersion to Asia. These “push” factors need to 
complement an analysis of “pull” factors, i.e. differences in the cost of employing a chip design 
engineer across locations that result from comparative factor and resource advantages, and from 
support policies that provide incentives and “public goods”. Pull factors are important - they 
explain what attracts chip design to particular locations. But they cannot explain under what 
conditions physical proximity can become a disadvantage rather than an advantage for 
innovative activities that involve highly complex technological knowledge. 
  To address this puzzling question, the paper has analyzed how radical changes in 
methodology (“system-level integration” through “modular design”) and organization 
(automated “design factory”) affect the geographic location of chip design. Both changes have 
been introduced to improve design productivity and to cope with the growing complexity at two 
levels of chip design: “silicon complexity”, i.e. malfunctions that result from the growing scale 
and density of the circuit and the introduction of new materials or design architectures; and 
“system complexity” that increases with the transition to system-level design with “exploding” 
multiple performance requirements. I show that de facto impacts fail to match with expectations: 
both changes in methodology and organization have further increased the cognitive and 
organizational complexity of design.  
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methodologies can produce the expected results. I show that integrated forms of design 
organization, where (almost) entire integrated circuits (ICs) are designed within a single firm, are 
giving way to vertical specialization where stages of chip design are outsourced to other firms 
(dis-integration of firm organization) and relocated across national boundaries (geographic 
dispersion). The paper emphasizes that far-reaching changes are required in skill requirements 
and work organization to reduce the resistance to the new methodology and organization of 
design. As this resistance is greater in industrialized countries than in Asia, this provides an 
additional powerful  incentive for relocating chip design to new lower-cost locations in Asia. 
It is important to emphasize that these findings add an important qualification to a widely 
accepted proposition that, as relevant knowledge can now be codified in frameworks and 
categories, codification will “naturally” enhance the division of innovative labor by lowering the 
transaction cost of technological knowledge (e.g., Arora  and Gambardella, 1994). As Tokumaru 
(2004: 3) observes, this concept of “knowledge” comes very close to Arrow’s (1962) concept of 
context-independent information that can be easily transmitted. By reducing learning to 
information processing, that proposition neglects the increasing complexity of technological 
knowledge that accompanies the process of codification, as this paper demonstrates for chip 
design. 
The paper also adds a second important qualification to the study of internationalization of 
innovation. I emphasize that vertical specialization does not imply that the “Visible Hand” of 
large global corporations will become invisible (as argued, for instance, in Langlois, 2001), 
giving rise to a resurgence of market forces. In line with Pavitt (2003a and 2003 b), Brusoni 
(2003), Tokumaru (2004) , and Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt (2001), this paper introduces a 
counter-proposition: if  codification does not reduce complexity (which it fails to do in chip 
design), then the division of innovative labor will remain constrained, and requires more (not 
less) coordination through system integrators or network flagships. This confirms Brusoni’s 
(2003:11) observation that firms  “are not replaced by markets, but by the temporary hierarchy 
defined within a specific project”. For each specific project, for instance the design of an 
embedded micro-controller for a mobile phone for Motorola, the global design network (GDN) 
“provides a temporary administrative framework within which some form of hierarchical 
coordination replaces the market.” (ibid: 15) 
Based on interviews with a representative sample of strategic groups of firms that together 
shape the development of chip design, I show that network integration is the necessary 
complement to vertical specialization. Global corporations (the “network flagships”) integrate 
geographically dispersed companies (the “network suppliers”) that are contributing to the 
complete solution of a particular chip design project into hierarchical GDNs. Vertical 
specialization increases the number and variety of network participants, as well as the variety of 
business models, which in turn increases the organizational complexity of these networks. I 
show that this growing organizational complexity gives rise to multiple design interfaces that 
pose very demanding coordination requirements. For each SoC design project, a design team 
needs to manage at least six main types of design interfaces: with system designers, with SIP 
providers, with software developers, with verification teams, with EDA tool vendors, as well as 
with foundry services (fabrication).  
I show that, in order to cope with the growing complexity of chip design, GDNs are 
asymmetric: flagships dominate control over network resources and decision-making. This 
implies that these networks do not necessarily give rise to less hierarchical forms of firm 
organization (as predicted, for instance, in Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989, and in Nohria and Eccles, 
1992). GDNs typically consist of various hierarchical layers, ranging from network flagships that 
dominate such networks, due to their capacity for system integration (Pavitt, 2003 b), down to a 
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geographically dispersed GDNs  requires system integrators who are able to frame problems 
(system architecture and design building blocks or SIPs) by identifying and “freezing” the 
crucial technological and organizational interdependencies. Global design network flagships thus 
need to retain diversified technology bases (“design libraries”) in order to coordinate the 
development of the underlying knowledge bases
35. 
But GDNs cannot work without quite extensive sharing of knowledge. This is necessary in 
order  to upgrade the suppliers` capabilities, so that they can meet the technical specifications of 
the flagships. In line with Rugman and D’Cruz (2000), we find that the hierarchical nature of 
design networks apparently facilitates knowledge transfer. Their asymmetric distribution of 
resources, power and decision-making can facilitate trust and credible commitments, enhancing 
stability, coherence and organizational learning. This reduces the risks that flagships encounter 
when sharing technology. 
The paper highlights two enabling forces that are gradually reducing constraints to the 
diffusion of design knowledge to Asia: ICT-enhanced information management, and the 
integration of geographically dispersed design communities (the “transnational knowledge 
communities”). GDNs expand inter-firm linkages across national boundaries, increasing the need 
for knowledge diffusion. ICT-enhanced information management provides not only new 
opportunities for information exchange, but also for the sharing and joint creation of knowledge. 
Finally, transnational knowledge communities add the critically  important missing link: they 
facilitate the exchange of tacit knowledge that is necessary to cope with growing design 
complexity. It is this new mobility of knowledge that explains why chip design is moving to 
Asia, despite its high knowledge intensity. 
                                                           
35 This confirms the findings of Granstrand, Patel, and Pavitt (1997) that large firms are more diversified in the 
technologies they master than the products that they make and that their technological diversity has been increasing 
while typically their product range has narrowed. 
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plus interviews (Taiwan, South Korea, China)
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